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Korea */ squandering a mandate for change?
DAVID HUNDT
In winning the presidential and legislative elections of 20078, the Grand
National Party and its leader Lee Myung-bak have attained a potentially
unique opportunity to influence South Korea’s political, economic and
diplomatic trajectory. This paper reviews Korea’s ‘once in a generation’
election and prospects for change under President Lee. Despite the political
capital accrued from his party’s landslide victories, Lee appears set to
replicate previous incumbents of the presidency, each of whom has been
overwhelmed by the high expectations of the public on the one hand, and
the harsh constraints imposed by Korea’s geopolitical position on the other.
Introduction
The Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea, ROK) holds elections for its single-
term presidency every five years, while National Assembly elections are held
every four.1 Following large-scale protests for democracy, former general Roh
Tae-woo won a competitive and open presidential election in December 1987,
and elections for the National Assembly were held in April 1988 (see Kim
2003). The recent elections in Korea  for the presidency in December 2007 and
the National Assembly in April 2008  were the first since the momentous polls
of the late 1980s to be so closely aligned. Whereas previous legislative elections
have served as an opportunity for Korean voters to register an interim judgment
on the president, their new leader  Lee Myung-bak of the conservative Grand
National Party (GNP)  was less than two months in to his five-year term at the
time of the ‘once in a generation’ National Assembly elections. It was thus no
surprise that the GNP mirrored Lee’s landslide victory, with the party winning a
majority in the National Assembly.
At first blush these results appear to be highly significant, granting the new
president a rare opportunity to leave his mark on the Korean political
landscape. The electorate had returned the GNP to power after 10 years of
centreleft (‘progressive’) government, the hallmarks of which were the opening
of the Korean economy to greater competition, a commitment to reconciliation
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with North Korea, and a re-evaluation of the longstanding military alliance
with the United States. Given that Lee’s campaign for the presidency, and that
of the GNP in the legislative elections, focused on these three issues, it is worth
investigating their potential for change over the next five years. In what ways 
if any  is Korea’s foreign policy likely to change? And to what degree was
foreign policy a factor in the elections? This article argues that despite, and
indeed partly due to, the high expectations placed on the new president to make
discernible change to foreign policy, such change is unlikely. Despite the
numerous flaws of his predecessors, Lee is instead likely to modify and build
upon, rather than overturn, their policy framework.
The tyranny of mandates
As noted at the outset, it has been rare for a president to enjoy a majority in the
National Assembly. While there are numerous causes for Korean leaders to
govern without a mandate for thoroughgoing change, three factors are of
overwhelming importance: the weakness of the party system, the persistence of
regionalism, and the inability of presidents to meet the expectations of the
electorate.
A distinctive feature of the Korean political system is the fluidity of political
parties. The average lifespan for a political party is just 31 months. The polity
has undergone countless cycles of party formation, splintering and dissolution
since the founding of the republic in 1948 (Croissant 2002: 2512). Unlike most
Western political systems, in which stable parties emerge on both the left and
right sides of an ideological or class-based spectrum, the Korean polity has been
characterised by competition along regional lines. Furthermore, parties have
formed and re-formed in accordance with loyalties to specific leaders rather
than a coherent ideological platform.
Korea, along with Japan, Malaysia and Indonesia, belongs to a subset of East
Asian countries in which the overbearing influence of anti-communism and the
subsequent emasculation of leftist parties during the Cold War has reduced the
salience of ideology and class to the party system. Nonetheless, Korea is
noteworthy even among this group in lacking a hegemonic ruling party that has
proven capable of commanding legislative majorities over long periods of time
(Armstrong 2008: 120). Successive authoritarian governments, beginning with
that of former president Park Chung Hee, sought to create precisely such a party
in order to maintain conservative dominance in a civilian guise. Despite being
the most powerful political force since 1948, Korean conservatives have not
created a party capable of dominating the body politic in the same way as, for
instance, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party or Indonesia’s Golkar. Despite Roh
Tae-woo coaxing long-time opposition leader Kim Young-sam into a ‘grand
coalition’ prior to the 1992 election, that merged entity failed to garner majority
support at the subsequent National Assembly elections. Not even Korea’s
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pluralist voting system  a combination of single-member constituencies and
seats allocated according to party lists  which tends to disproportionately
benefit the largest parties, has allowed the GNP in its various renditions to
consistently command a legislative majority (Croissant 2002: 2523).
The second factor inhibiting the mandate of Korean presidents has been the
tendency of large swathes of the electorate to vote in accordance with regional
loyalties rather than the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party (Kang
2003). Since the elections of 1987, voting blocs have developed in certain parts
of the country with loyalties to the ‘three Kims’ of contemporary Korean
politics. The southeast (Gyeongsang) and northeast (Gangwon) provinces have
voted en masse for the conservative GNP, with Kim Young-sam (president
19938) and his loyalists as standard bearers. The southwest (Jeolla) provinces,
in contrast, have offered undying support to Kim Dae-jung and his left-leaning
Democratic Party in its various guises. The central Chungcheon provinces have
been generally conservative in outlook, but smaller in number than the southern
provinces; Chungcheon played a crucial swing role when Kim Jong-pil brought
the region into an unholy alliance with progressive forces to overturn the
dominance of Gyeongsang from the late 1990s. Most notably, the victory of
Kim Dae-jung in the 1997 presidential election  the first instance of power
shifting away from the conservative elite  was only possible due to Kim Jong-
pil’s decision to withdraw from the race and to direct his supporters to vote
against the GNP’s Lee Hoi-chang (Armstrong 2008: 122; Croissant 2002: 233).
While these regional blocs have survived even the most recent round of
elections, voting patterns in Seoul and its immediate vicinity have been more
fluid. For instance, the trade union-backed Democratic Labor Party (DLP)
became Korea’s first truly leftist party to legally contest elections when it ran
candidates for the National Assembly in 2000. The DLP won 10 seats in the
2004 elections, giving organised labour new-found influence in national politics
(see Lee and Lim 2006). A further development has been the emergence of
younger voters as a new, coherent voting bloc, especially in the capital region.
Adhering less to the anti-communist worldview of their parents and voters in
the eastern provinces, the youth vote in Seoul proved decisive to the victory of
Roh Moo-hyun in the 2002 presidential election.
A third factor that has limited the effectiveness of the presidency has been a
chronic inability to meet public expectations, and a concomitant willingness on
the part of voters to punish governments who they deem to be derelict of duty.
For instance, the combined forces of Kim Dae-jung’s Millennium Democratic
Party (MDP) and Kim Jong-pil’s United Liberal Democrats won 132 seats in the
2000 election, as opposed to 133 for the GNP. Instead of bolstering support for
the government in by-elections held two years later, voters instead gave the
GNP a majority (Croissant 2002: 269).
By that stage Kim had little more than nine months remaining in his term,
leaving him vulnerable to the lame-duck syndrome that inflicts Korea’s single-
term presidencies. In the case of Kim, it was Roh Moo-hyun who emerged as the
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MDP’s candidate for the 2002 election. Roh capitalised on the wave of anti-
Americanism, fuelled by the inclusion of North Korea in the Axis of Evil and
also by the death of two Korean schoolgirls in an accident involving an
American military vehicle, to win the presidency. With 49% of the vote, Roh
narrowly defeated the GNP’s Lee Hoi-chang (47%) and consigned the
conservatives to another five years in opposition.
Even by the standards of Korean politics, Roh’s presidency proved to be filled
with drama. A rift between Roh and Kim Dae-jung saw the new president leave
the MDP and form the Yeollin Uri Party (‘Our Open Party’). Only about 80
legislators transferred their loyalties to the new party, and this proved
insufficient to prevent Roh being referred to the Constitutional Court in March
2004 on impeachment charges. The president was accused of violating the
Constitution when he advocated a vote for the Uri Party at the National
Assembly elections slated for April (Ko¨llner 2007: 16). According to the
Constitution, the chief executive should remain neutral in elections. The GNP,
along with the rump of the MDP, voted to impeach the president. Roh was
forced to step down for two months while the Court considered the charges, but
was later exonerated.
The public sided with the president, and his party consequently secured a
majority at the April elections amid the highly charged atmosphere of the
impeachment. Rather than serving as an interim judgment on Roh’s presidency,
the election thus became an opportunity for the public to punish the GNP and
MDP for what was considered to be an abuse of legislative power. Granted a
historic majority in extraordinary circumstances, the ruling party faced even
greater expectations than usual. Roh’s government soon lost support, and his
approval ratings plummeted within a few months of the election. The Uri Party
retained its majority until a series of by-elections losses in mid 2006. Roh’s
party also lost heavily in local elections held at that time, revealing a pent-up
wave of discontent about the president (Ko¨llner 2007: 910). This culminated in
the spectacular implosion of the party in February and Roh’s departure from the
party in order to minimise the impact on Uri’s candidate at the presidential
election in December.
The elections of 20078
Already much weakened by its internal ructions and the defection of almost half
its elected representatives, the United Democratic Party (UDP), successor to Uri,
confronted a formidable candidate from the GNP. Lee Myung-bak, whose
professional career included stints as CEO of the Hyundai Group, legislator in
the National Assembly and also mayor of Seoul, campaigned primarily on his
credentials in economic management. Using the slogan of ‘747’, Lee promised
to raise annual economic growth to 7%, to increase per capita income to
$40,000 and to make Korea the world’s seventh largest economy within a
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decade. He also called for further deregulation of the economy and the
privatisation of public enterprises, tax incentives for research and development,
a canal project to link the north and south of the country, and a tougher line on
negotiations with North Korea (ICG 2008: 2).
Lee won 49% of the vote, as opposed to 27% for Chung Dong-young, the
UDP candidate. Lee Hoi-chang, running as an independent, won 15%. The
margin of victory was the greatest of any Korean president. The traditional
heartlands held for two major political groupings: Lee Myung-bak swept the
southeast and northeast, while Chung dominated the southwest and centre.
Once again, the capital region, home to 25 million people, decided the election.
However, on this occasion, voters in and around the capital  many of them
enamoured with Lee after his time as mayor  plumped for the conservative
candidate rather than Roh’s successor. A low turnout suggested that many
young voters who supported for the leftprogressive candidates in 2002 and
2004 did not vote in the 2007 election (Armstrong 2008: 1247).
In the National Assembly elections in April 2008, Lee’s GNP won 153 seats,
a narrow majority in the 299-seat legislature, while the UDP was reduced to 81
seats and five for the DLP. A splinter of the GNP  followers of Lee’s rival for
the presidential nomination, Park Geun-hye  won 11 seats, bolstering the GNP
to 164 when Park’s renegades rejoined the party in June (Armstrong 2008:
11517; ICG 2008: 4, 15). When coupled with other conservative parties in the
National Assembly, the GNP was within striking distance of the two-thirds
majority that would allow the governing party to amend the Constitution.
The economy was the single biggest issue for voters, with over half of those
polled (54%) nominating it as the main determinant of their voting behaviour.
The related issue of inequality ranked second, followed by foreign policy. A
decade on from the Asian financial crisis, the conventional measures suggested
that the Korean economy was robust: growth was close to 5% and Time ranked
Korea as the world’s 11th most competitive economy (Lie and Kim 2008:
1223). Furthermore, in 2006 Korea’s exports hit an all-time high of $300
billion, and rates of unemployment and inflation were relatively low. However,
these macroeconomic successes did not translate sufficiently into improvements
in living standards at the household level, which explains the salience of
inequality in the minds of Korean voters. The electorate blamed President Roh
for policies that increased inequality, and there was a widespread perception
that a decade of economic reform had debased Korea’s egalitarianism. Statistics
support this perception: the Gini Coefficient (the difference in income between
the richest quartile of the population and the poorest) increased from 0.296 in
1996 to 0.344 in 2004 (Ko¨llner 2007: 1824).
In the context of the previous two decades, the elections of 20078 were thus
significant for three reasons: despite the persistence of regional voting blocs in
the southeast and southwest, the capital region confirmed its newfound status
as the arbiter of national elections; the capital’s support for Lee shattered a
short-lived period of relative balance between Korean conservatives and their
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progressive counterparts; and the new president would begin his term in office
with a degree of authority unprecedented in the democratic era. The crucial
caveat, as always, was that the electorate expected Lee to use his powers in an
optimal manner, and voters would be ready to punish their new leader if those
expectations were not met satisfactorily.
Having established the domestic context in which Lee has come to power,
this article turns to the potential for policy change under the new government.
What do the first few months of the new government’s term indicate about the
prospects for change in each major facet of foreign policy?
Addressing alliances
Shoring up Korea’s alliance with the United States was a key plank of Lee’s
campaign for the presidency, and the GNP also flagged an improvement of ties
with Korea’s main ally when campaigning for the National Assembly. If Lee can
elicit a firm commitment from the US to maintain its troop presence in Korea, he
will have succeeded in differentiating his presidency from that of Roh Moo-
hyun. Rarely has the USKorea alliance witnessed such a seemingly incompatible
pairing of leaders than in the period from 2003 until early 2008. The alliance
appeared destined for turmoil even during Roh’s election campaign, as Roh
harnessed a growing anti-American sentiment. Consequently, the Bush admin-
istration was confronted with a Korean leader who openly questioned the
rationale of the alliance. At a time when the US was focused on the War on
Terror and expecting allies such as Korea and Japan to militarily and politically
support its campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and beyond, Roh’s election victory
could not have been less auspicious. The new president publicly questioned
Washington’s justification for invading Iraq, and initially refused to countenance
the deployment of Korean troops in either the conventional military phase of the
war or the subsequent reconstruction. Roh eventually agreed to send some 3,600
non-combat troops to Iraq, but the Bush administration was dissatisfied with the
Korean government’s willingness to publicly support the deployment.
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s campaign for a more flexible global
configuration of American troops also had implications for the alliance. The US
sought to change the mission statement of the military presence in Korea from
merely the defence of the ROK to a wider ‘roving commission’ throughout East
Asia. The Roh government opposed this reconfiguration of US military assets in
East Asia, on the grounds that ‘strategic flexibility’ could imply the use of
American forces against China in the Taiwan Strait  or against North Korea 
without the assent of ROK (Ross 2006: 3812). For the US, this public criticism
of its global and regional policy objectives was tantamount to being second-
guessed by an ungrateful ally, and was far removed from the deference that
Washington expects of its allies.
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A related issue was which party would exercise control of Korean forces if
conflict should occur on the peninsula. Whereas Korea assumed peacetime
control of its own forces in the 1990s, wartime control still remains in American
hands. In 2006, Rumsfeld announced that wartime control would revert to the
ROK by 2009. While this was sooner than the Korean side preferred, and the
date was subsequently delayed until 2012, even this later date was unsatisfac-
tory for conservatives. Serving and retired military officers, for instance, argued
that the reversion to Korean control was premature and detrimental to national
security (Armstrong 2008: 126; ICG 2008: 6; Kirk 2008a).
Since assuming office, the Lee administration has sought to delay the
reversion of wartime control well beyond 2012. To date there has been no
agreement on an extension of ongoing American control, despite President Bush
committing the US to the defence of Korea during his visit to Seoul in July 2008
(the third summit between the leaders in less than six months). Lee appears
willing to give the tangible sign of support that the US seeks from Korea, and in
a more convincing manner than Roh. Most Korean troops have returned from
duty in Iraq, and any deployment to a conflict where there is no obvious Korean
interest would be deeply unpopular. Nonetheless a solidification of the alliance
is likely at least as long as Lee and Bush remain in power. Indeed a
strengthening is likely, regardless of which party takes the White House in
November.
Just as President Lee has sought to work more closely with the US, he
promised to repair Korea’s relations with Japan. The conservative side of
Korean politics achieved an at times uneasy but workable modus vivendi with
Japan in the 1960s. Central to the establishment of diplomatic relations
between the two countries in 1965 was the economic aspect of bilateral ties:
conservative hero Park Chung Hee (whose daughter controls an influential
faction of the GNP) was firm in the belief that Japan could serve as a model for
Korea’s own development. Furthermore, argued Park, establishing ties with
Japan would solidify the US-led alliance system in East Asia. Park and his
conservative successors thus sought to set aside the painful memories of Japan’s
colonisation of Korea during the first half of the 20th century.
Just as the progressive governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun
were more sceptical about the innate value of the American alliance, they also
encouraged Koreans to rethink ties with Japan. In particular, Roh, along with
Chinese leaders, lambasted what they perceived to be Japan’s embellishment of
events during the Pacific War, and the way in which these events have been
portrayed through Japanese history textbooks. The repeated visits of the then
Japanese prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, to the Yasukuni Shrine especially
incensed Roh. For the leaders of Korea and China, these visits to the shrine 
where over two million war dead are enshrined, including several Class A war
criminals such as Tojo Hideki  signal that the current Japanese government
implicitly approves of the actions of the imperial army during the war. For
instance, Roh stated: ‘While Japan has issued statements of regret and apologies
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for its past wrongdoings at various occasions, we are led to question their
sincerity when they are marred by acts at odds with their expressions of
repentance’ (Roh 2007: 11).
Koizumi’s final visit to Yasukuni occurred on 15 August 2006, the
anniversary of Japan’s surrender at the end of the war. His successors have
subsequently stayed away from the shrine, somewhat reducing the tensions of
bilateral relations. Under Lee Myung-bak, a gradual improvement in relations
with Japan appears likely. Lee is less likely to invoke the history issue and
instead focus on economic elements of bilateral ties. Nonetheless, the history
issue will never be definitively vanquished, as evidenced by the revival of the
Tokdo/Takeshima dispute in 2008. The new president received a fillip when
President Bush sided with Korea over Japan when the US was inadvertently
dragged into the longstanding territorial dispute. The ownership of Tokdo/
Takeshima was revived when the Board on Geographic Names  the body
responsible for standardising the way that the US government refers to
geographic objects such as rivers, seas and islands  suggested changing the
description of the islets, officially referred to as Liancourt Rocks, from being
Korean territory to ‘undesignated sovereignty’. After protestations from Korea,
the Board decided to retain the status quo rather than proceed with the
proposed change (Alford 2008: 8). Lee will seek to differentiate his government
from that of Roh Moo-hyun by managing issues such as territorial disputes in a
less confrontational manner.
Sunshine policy
A crucial area of policy collaboration between the US, Japan and South Korea
will come in terms of Lee’s approach to the North, and in particular in respect
to the Sunshine Policy, the centrepiece of the Kim and Roh governments’
diplomacy. An article of faith in the Cold War period  and a founding principle
of the ROK’s Constitution  was to deny the North’s existence as a separate
state and as a mode of political organisation that was distinct from the South.
For this reason Bruce Cumings has argued that Kim Dae-jung did ‘more to
change policy toward the North than any previous South Korea or US president’
(2007: 28). Kim emphasised the creation of people-to-people ties, and after the
Pyongyang summit in June 2000 a series of reunions were arranged for families
separated by the Korean War.
Further, the Sunshine Policy envisaged national unification occurring
gradually through reconciliation rather than war or a collapse in North Korea.
Roh Moo-hyun reconfirmed this understanding in late 2007: ‘We do not want
to achieve unification through absorption of the North; neither do we consider
it feasible’ (quoted in Lankov 2008: 11). Just months before the end of his term
in office, Roh visited North Korea for a summit with Kim Jong Il. Commercial
agreements dominated the summit, with the prospect of large-scale South
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Korean investment in sectors of the North’s economy such as shipbuilding, in
which the ROK faces rising labour costs. The two sides also agreed to expand
the Kaesong industrial zone, and to upgrade railway networks so that South
Korea could access continental Asia and beyond (Lie and Kim 2008: 121).
While the new government appears willing to continue with economic
agreements that relieve pressure on local firms, change is likely in its attitude to
refugees. A series of mass attempts to gain asylum occurred in the early 2000s,
as North Koreans sought refuge in diplomatic compounds in China. The PRC
began a harsh crackdown, and forcibly repatriated some asylum seekers. For
instance, Chinese authorities repatriated about 6,000 North Koreans in the first
wave of expulsions in 2000, while a second campaign in the winter of 2002
netted over 3,200 refugees. A further sweep, in late 2003, resulted in hundreds
of North Koreans being repatriated (Beck et al. 2007: 251).
Lee is sympathetic to efforts by South Korean churches and NGOs to assist
the flight of refugees from the North. Whereas the Kim and Roh governments
were mindful of the reaction of the Pyongyang regime and also China to the
refugee issue, Lee is more willing to cater to the demands of his conservative
base, which is desirous of ‘regime change’ in the North. A sustained outflow of
refugees, NGOs argue, will create a similar dynamic to East Germany, where
the visible flight of citizens sapped the morale of the communist government
and contributed to its downfall in 1989 (Caryl 2008).
The new president has insisted that the North must request aid before it is
given. Lee argues that his predecessor was too willing to offer aid unilaterally,
and that the Pyongyang regime needs to offer tangible evidence of not only
gratitude but also a willingness to achieve reconciliation. For instance, the new
president has proposed a full-scale restructuring of the North Korean economy
and its integration into that of the South: in effect, an amicable takeover that
would lay the groundwork for unification. This implies that Pyongyang must
cede economic sovereignty to Seoul and acknowledge the superiority of the
ROK’s economic system. Furthermore, Lee has premised this proposed
generosity, the stated aim of which is to raise North Korean incomes to
$3,000 per person within a decade, on the definitive cessation of all nuclear-
related programs and hostility aimed at the South. This more sceptical and
conditional approach to engagement with the North appears to be in keeping
with public sentiment. Support for unification has cooled in recent years,
especially since rehabilitating the North is forecast to exact a greater cost on
South Korea (between $300 billion and $1 trillion), in relative terms, than
German unification. A new pragmatism appears to be emerging, whereby the
Korean public is willing to assist the North  and even exploit it  so long as the
welfare of the South Korean economy is prioritised (Armstrong 2008: 12830;
Lie and Kim 2008: 1212).
Recent tensions have emerged due to the shooting of a Korean civilian at the
Mt Kumkang resort on 11 July, further vindicating Lee’s change of tack on
engagement with the North. The Pyongyang government claimed that the
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tourist, a female in her early 50s, had strayed into a restricted zone, and that one
of its troops shot the Southerner when she failed to obey orders to stop moving.
The ROK suspended tourist arrivals while undertaking an investigation, and
found reason to doubt the North’s account of the affair (AP 2008b). In response
the Pyongyang regime has ordered that all non-essential personnel vacate the
resort, throwing its viability into doubt.
Regardless of the new president’s rhetoric, the architect of the Sunshine Policy
has predicted that engagement will remain the mainstream in North Korean
policy. On the new president, Kim Dae-jung recently said: ‘Lee is also making
some changes. I realize he was arguing with my policy . . . but I think he will
come to accept it’ (quoted in Kirk 2008b; see also Lankov 2008: 16). In this
sense, both the conservative and progressive sides of Korean politics remain
committed to aid programs for the North, although they differ in the rhetoric
that accompanies it.
Nuclear issues and the China challenge
The new government claims that the North remains strong in its determination
to attain nuclear weapons. While opposing the North’s acquisition of a nuclear
capacity, the Kim and Roh governments rejected the use of force to resolve the
issue, and argued that even discussing such an option was detrimental to
prospects for reconciliation. They argued that the North, in the early phases of
the Sunshine Policy, was gradually adopting a less threatening posture. In this
argument, it was the inauguration of George W. Bush that caused the North to
revert to belligerence early this decade.
Champions of the Sunshine Policy claim that events such as the inclusion of
North Korea in the Axis of Evil were crucial to Pyongyang’s determination to
pursue a nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, in late 2002 the Bush administration
charged that, in addition to the conventional refining programme that the
North had suspended and put under IAEA supervision at Yongbyon, the regime
had a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program. The North denied the charge,
and responded by reactivating its Yongbyon reactor, expelling the IAEA
inspectors and switching off the cameras that had monitored the reactor for
the previous eight years. The regime also announced that it would quit the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In early 2003 the North began to reprocess
the spent fuel rods that had been stored under IAEA supervision, and connected
the power generation facilities at Yongbyon to the HEU reprocessing program
(Cumings 2007: 334).
The Six Party Talks (SPT), which brought together the Koreas, Japan, the US,
China and Russia, sought to dissuade the North from testing a weapon and thus
openly declaring itself a nuclear power. The talks were suspended in late 2005
when it was revealed that, under pressure from the US Treasury, the Macao-
based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) had frozen $25 million in accounts held by the
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North Korean government and associated trading companies. The North
responded to the seizure of its funds by threatening to test a nuclear weapon.
Although the region’s power warned the North of the consequences of such a
move, Pyongyang tested missiles in July 2006, and detonated a small nuclear
device in October (ICG 2006).
The South Korean government faced a domestic backlash after the nuclear
test. Roh’s critics argued that the ROK had subsidised the development of the
North’s nuclear arsenal through humanitarian and economic aid under the
auspices of the Sunshine Policy. The GNP called for closer policy alignment
with the US, with some conservatives advocating the reversion to the ROK’s
traditional hard-line approach to the North. It was in this context that Lee, then
emerging as a frontrunner for the GNP’s presidential nomination, began
demanding that conditions be attached to South Korea’s aid programs.
The next phase of negotiations involved a greater degree of conditionality,
but also concessions to North Korea. In February 2007, China brokered an
agreement for a phased nuclear freeze whereby the North would be rewarded
for each step it took toward disarmament. That is, it would receive aid in return
for specific actions rather than just the promise of them. The crux of the deal
was that the US agreed to release the BDA funds in return for the North shutting
Yongbyon (again), and verifying details of all its nuclear programmes and
weapons caches by the end of 2007.
North Korea missed several of these deadlines, and negotiations continued
well into 2008 to ensure that Pyongyang had definitively ended its nuclear
programs. It is noteworthy that the most significant changes from North Korea
resulted from direct negotiations with the US. For instance, it was the Bush
administration that negotiated the terms of the destruction of the Yongbyon
reactor in July 2008, in return for which Pyongyang sent an invoice to the US
for $2.5 million. Washington also took possession of some 18,000 documents
relating to the North’s nuclear activities over two decades. Similarly, progress
on a final settlement of the nuclear issue may hinge on whether the US delivers
on its promises to establish full diplomatic ties and to remove North Korea from
the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. In late August, the
North retaliated to what it regarded as American intransigence on the removal
of Pyongyang from the terror list by halting efforts to disable its nuclear
facilities.
Much to the chagrin of the GNP, the North has avoided direct negotiations
with the ROK, and this issue was central to Lee’s criticism of the Roh
government. And yet insofar as Pyongyang has dealt directly with Washington,
the mode of negotiations is reminiscent of the first nuclear crisis in 19934,
when the Kim Young-sam government was relegated to the sidelines. Just as the
Kim government had little influence over proceedings in the early 1990s, so too
has the Lee government been forced to adjust its rhetoric on North Korea.
Already it has backed away from its promise to make aid conditional on the
North displaying gratitude to the ROK. Further, the new government may deem
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it necessary to repair its relations with Pyongyang prior to the US elections in
November, for fear that the next American president will adopt a new template
for dealing with North Korea.
Despite China and the ROK pouring so much diplomatic effort into the Six
Party Talks, this mechanism proved ineffective in dealing with North Korea’s
nuclear proliferation. Policy coordination between China and the progressive
South Korean governments was effective in economic and technical matters, but
comparatively less so in political ones. This was evident in China’s unwilling-
ness to side with the ROK against Pyongyang, and by Chinese sensitivity about
potential infringements of its own sovereignty. China’s willingness to override
humanitarian concerns about the fate of refugees in the border region only
underlined this tendency. The Sunshine Policy envisaged economic opening as a
means of sowing the seeds precisely for the type of political transformation that
the Chinese leadership seeks to avoid, representing regime change from within.
If China proves unwilling to abet this transformation, its utility to the ROK as a
diplomatic partner becomes more circumscribed. As a result the return to a US-
centric foreign policy appears likely to intensify under Lee Myung-bak.
Foreign economic policy
A defining feature of the Kim and Roh presidencies was economic reform, and
in particular a further shift away from the mercantilist elements that had roots
in the Park Chung Hee era. For instance the Kim government oversaw the
opening the economy under the aegis of the IMF bailout in 19978 and the
subsequent exposure of the chaebols (large family-owned enterprises) to greater
competition. Government spending was reduced, decision-making structures
were decentralised, the labour market was liberalised and employment
protections reduced, financial reforms were enacted to increase the quality of
loans, and new regulations were introduced to improve standards of corporate
governance (see Hundt 2005: 2457). On assuming office, Kim’s successor took
these reforms further by signing a raft of free trade agreements (FTAs). Under
Roh, Korea finalised FTAs with Chile in 2003, and with both Singapore and the
European Union in 2006. What is more, some 45 agreements are at various
stages of completion, making Korea the world’s most active negotiator of FTAs
(Armstrong 2008: 125; Lie and Kim 2008: 122).
The GNP is unlikely to turn back this wave of reform, which occurred in
the broader context of the emergence of conditions less conducive to the
operation of the ‘developmental state’. Amid increasing neoliberal globalisa-
tion, not even archetypal developmental states such as Korea and Japan have
withstood the pressure to abandon some of the more potent instruments of
dirigisme (see Radice 2008). Indeed one of the first decisions of the Lee
Myung-bak government was to lift restrictions on the importation of
American beef, the final impediment to the ratification of the FTA the Roh
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government signed in early 2007. Imports of beef from the US were suspended
in 2003 because some American cattle had been infected with ‘mad cow
disease’, which can be transmitted to humans. As part of the process of
ratifying the FTA, the new government agreed to remove restrictions on
American produce.
In April protests against beef imports began on a relatively small scale, but by
mid June they were rivalling the demonstrations that brought down the
authoritarian government two decades ago. One of the biggest rallies against
beef imports was scheduled for 11 June, coinciding with the date on which, in
1987, a university student was killed in anti-government demonstrations.
Whereas organisers claimed that up to 700,000 people participated and police
countered that only 100,000 were involved, media outlets estimated that
around 300,000 people were present (AP 2008a: 8).
In addition to the beef protests, the government faced a truckers’ strike in
protest against higher fuel prices, as well as protests against the rising cost of
housing and education. Within a month, a coalition of opposition forces had
seized the momentum created by protests over beef to seriously hinder the new
government’s agenda. As a result Lee began to wind back plans to privatise
various government agencies, and his deregulation agenda was also curtailed
(Armstrong 2008: 116).
The ‘dynamics-of-contention’ framework (see McAdam et al. 2001: 2746)
provides a useful way to understand how protests movements can quickly
mobilise and later demobilise. Social movements can find common cause across
and between classes; in this case, against a government suddenly seen as not
only incompetent but also insensitive to public opinion. The protests saw the
return of the ‘candlelit vigils’ that accompanied two other rallying points for
the leftprogressive side of Korean politics in recent years: the deaths of the
schoolgirls due to the accident involving the American military vehicle, and the
attempted impeachment of President Roh in 2004. On both occasions,
protesters expressly invoked the memory of the pro-democracy demonstrations
of 1987 to mobilise support to their cause (ICG 2008: 7).
Nonetheless, coalitions can easily dissolve, as the 1987 and 2008 protests
illustrate. In both cases, the moderate middle classes did not lend support to
the protests indefinitely. During the protests against Lee, conservatives
accused those on the streets of falling for communist propaganda, and
partaking in treasonous anti-government activities. There was also a counter-
mobilisation of conservative forces, especially during and in the lead-up to
President Bush’s visit in July. In this sense, the pattern of mobilisation and
ensuing demobilisation is evident.
Two decisions by the Bush administration in July reduced the pressure on
Lee somewhat. First, as noted earlier in the paper, Bush sided with Korea in
the Tokdo/Takeshima spat. And second, the administration agreed to alter the
agreement on beef imports so that only cattle under 30 months of age  and
thus whose potential for infection was lower than older cattle  would be
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eligible for import to Korea. This face-saving gesture went some way towards
placating the protests against the Lee government (Revere 2008: 14).
Conclusions
When Koreans voted in record numbers for Lee Myung-bak in December 2007,
they could not have foreseen the dramas that would engulf his first six months
in office. Allegations of embezzlement, though later dispelled, dogged Lee
throughout his election campaign, and suspicions were raised about some of his
nominations for cabinet ministries. Despite being neither trusted nor loved, Lee
was not only elected but enjoyed high approval ratings until mid March.
However, Lee’s approval rating dropped alarmingly in his first 100 days. After
starting at levels of 5060%, Lee’s performance rating plummeted to around
20% (ICG 2008: 4). Furthermore, the GNP lost a series of by-elections in June,
even in its strongholds in the southeast. As a result of this uncomfortable
repetition of Roh’s losses in 2006, Lee faces the familiar problem of unmet
expectations. The crucial difference is that Lee could enjoy the support of a
legislative majority for at least four years.
In terms of the main facets of foreign policy discussed in this article, the single
biggest change that Lee has made has been to recommit Korea to the American
alliance. Even this decision, however, hardly qualifies as bold policy. Main-
tenance of the alliance was always probable and perhaps necessary after the
Roh period. A true test of Lee’s commitment could come if public opinion turns
against the US again. In these circumstances, would Lee remain steadfast to the
alliance in the face of rising public discontent? Lee has already backed away
from his positions on North Korea and beef imports, so doubts must be raised
about his stance on the alliance.
In hindsight, it is perhaps unsurprising that the potential for generational
change offered after the elections of 20078 is unlikely to be realised. Such a
change is too much to ask of the conservative GNP, newly returned to power
after a decade in the unfamiliar role of loyal opposition. The new Korean
government will command a legislative majority for several years, but the
potential exists for new political groupings focused on the aspirations of
the vote-rich capital region to emerge. Can the opposition forces that have
orchestrated the recent protests translate public discontent into a cohesive
political movement? Or will the GNP ride out the current wave of protests and
instead prove to be impervious to conventional political challenge?
These are important questions not only for South Korean domestic politics
but also the country’s engagement in the broader AsiaPacific region. The ROK
is highly attuned to geopolitical affairs, and the stance of its government will
necessarily impact on regional issues  not least of all the stability of North
Korea. Furthermore, the ROK can play a crucial role in either facilitating or
hindering the normalisation of Japan’s foreign policy. Finally, South Korea
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shapes as a litmus test of both the validity of the American-led alliance system
and also China’s aspirations to regional leadership. For all these reasons, the
actions of the new Korean government will attract attention from others in the
region during the next five years.
Note
1. The author is grateful to the editors of AJIA for their thoughtful comments and feedback on
the initial version of this paper, but accepts full responsibility for the final version.
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